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Tax Structure and Public Sector Growth
ABSTRACT
It has been hypothesized that a jurisdiction's tax structure exerts an
independent effect upon the growth of its public sector. We test this
hypothesis by examining the relationship between the growth of state general
expenditure and the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to income. The
work takes advantage of a very careful set of income elasticities for the
personal income and sales tax systems for each state, for every year from
1978 to 1983. The main conclusion is that the data do not support the notion












There is much theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of
public sector growth. (See the surveys by Inman [1979] and Rubinfield
[1983].) One hypothesis is that a jurisdiction's tax structure exerts an
independent effect upon the growth of its public sector. James Buchanan,
for example, notes that "In a period of rapidly increasing national product,
that tax institution characterized by the highest elasticity will tend, other
things equal, to generate the largest volume of public spending." (Quoted in
Oates [1975, 140—141].) Why should the elasticity of tax revenue with respect
to income influence spending? After all, standard theoretical considerations
suggest that public sector size should depend on the variables that
determine citizens' demands for public goods and services (e.g., income,
demographic characteristics, etc.), and those that determine the supply of
public goods and services (e.g., input costs). The fact that tax revenues
happen to be elastic or inelastic with respect to income is of no particular
significance, according to this story. If, for example, incomes increase so
that a highly elastic tax structure produces more revenue than is required to
provide the optimal amount of public goods, then the excess revenues should
simply be rebated to taxpayers.
One possible explanation is that the association between income elastic
revenue systems and government growth is a consequence of "tax structure
illusion" on the part of uninformed voters.1 Suppose that legislators desire
to make the public sector as large as possible. Tn the presence of statutory
or' constitutional constraints on deficit spending, tax increases are needed to
fuel public sector growth. However, legislators realize that the process of
enacting tax increases focuses a lot of attention upon themselves, and this
1may invite a negative reaction from taxpayer/voters who do notwish to see
theirtax burdens grow larger. On the other hand, the automatic revenue
increases generated by an elastic tax schedule (when income is increasing)
engender no such attention. As Wagner [1976, p. 87] argues, "Everyone is
aware of a consciously enacted tax surcharge; a similar surcharge is enacted
every year when income grows under progressive taxation, but many
taxpayers remain unconscious of this surcharge."2
However, uninformed voters are not required to rationalize a correlation
between income elastic tax structures and public sector growth. Such a
correlation might reflect the desires of citizens who want the public sector to
grow at a proportionately higher rate than their incomes, and regard an
income elastic tax system as the most efficient way of achieving this goal.
Continual reexamination of budgetary parameters absorbs legislative
resources. In effect, an income elastic tax structure routinizes such changes,
and hence reduces transactions costs. An interesting special case of this
transaction costs view occurs when a majority of voters desires tax rates to
increase with income, while a minority does not.3 Suppose that in the future
the minority can thwart the majority's desire for higher tax rates, perhaps
because the former dominates the relevant legislative committees. The income
elastic structure can be viewed as a way of preventing the minority from
using this power to extract special benefits for itself.
Before struggling to determine whether uninformed or informed voter
models better explain the relationship between the income elasticity of tax
revenues and public sector growth, we should make sure that the
relationship actually exists. In an influential paper, Oates [1975] examined
the growth in public expenditure of the 50 states from 1960 to 1970 to
determine whether states which experienced larger growth had more elastic
2tax schedules. He found that there was such a relationship in the data, but
that it was of modest order.
One problem with Oates's paper and succeeding studies is thatvery
crude measures are used to characterize the income elasticity of tax
structures. Specifically, the elasticity of the tax structure is proxied by the
proportion of state revenues obtained from income taxation. To the extent
that income tax elasticities vary from state to state, such a measure willgive
misleading estimates. In addition, it fails to take into account that general
sales taxes, the other key component of state tax systems, are also
heterogeneous. Oates recognizes these facts, and indicates that he is forced
to use the potentially unsatisfactory proxy because of the absence of better
data.
Recently, we compiled a very careful set of income elasticities for the
income and sales tax systems for each state, for every year from 1978 to
1983. (See Feenberg and Rosen [1986].) This work suggests that across
states, there is a considerable variation in the elasticity of a particular tax
instrument.4 For example, in 1983, for those states which had individual
income tax systems, the elasticities ranged from 1.0 to 2.2, with a mean of
1.54 and a standard deviation of 0.39. When we consider income and sales
taxes as a single system, this heterogeneity continues to obtain—-the mean
elasticity is 1.09, with a standard deviation of 0.26.
In this paper, we take advantage of this unique data set to find out
whether or not there really is a relationship between the income elasticity of
state revenue systems and public sector growth. Another advantage of these
data is that they provide observations on the relevant variables for a series
of years. Analysis of such a panel allows us to control for effects of
3national conditions on state public sector growth, which cannot be done when
only the difference between one pair of years is examined.
In Section II we briefly review Oates's analysis, and subsequent studies
in this area. Section III describes the models to be estimated. Section IV
discusses the data, and Section V presents the results. The main conclusion
is that the data do not support the notion that the income elasticity of the
tax structure exerts an important independent effect on public sector
growth. Section VI concludes with a summary.
II. Previous Work
Oates [1975] conducted the first systematic examination of the
relationship between income elasticity of the tax system and public sector
growth. He postulates that the change in the level of state per capita
general expenditure for state i in year t is a linear function of changes in:
(a) a set of socio-economic determinants of public spending (e.g., median
family income); (b) per capita federal grants; and (c) the percentage of
state—local spending that is undertaken by the state government. He
augments this differenced equation with a measure of the income elasticity of
the tax structure for each state.
Oates investigates several proxies for the income elasticity of state tax
structure: the sum of individual tax receipts as a percentage of the sum of
total tax receipts; the sum of corporation tax receipts a percentage of total
tax receipts; and the sum of individual and corporate income tax receipts as
a percentage of total tax receipts. The general notion is that the higher the
proportion of tax receipts generated by income taxes, the higher the income
elasticity of the tax system as a whole. When the various measures are
entered in the expenditure growth regression, they tend to have positive
(but small) and statistically significant coefficients.
4Despite the importance of this finding, little effort has been made to
confirm or reject it. DiLorenzo [19811 is the only other study we have been
able to find which tries to examine the effect of the tax structure's income
elasticity upon expenditure growth. His observations are on county
governments rather than states. He finds a significant and negative
relationship between an Oates-type tax structure characterization and growth
in expenditure. DiLorenzo attributes this to the fact that at the county
level, Tiebout considerations may result in out—migration from communities
that have highly elastic tax schedules.
Several other studies have examined the effect of tax structure upon the
level of expenditure (or revenues). (See Craig and Hems [19801, Baker
[1983], and Breeden and Hunter [1985].) Such a specification seems curious
to us.If income elasticity of the tax system has an effect, the only
mechanism we can imagine is one in which changes in income lead to changes
in revenue, which lead to changes in spending. Apparently, the reason some
authors nevertheless look at levels is the fact that carried to its extreme, the
hypothesis that the income elasticity of tax structure affects changes in
spending implies that spending can increase without bound. (See Craig and
Hems [1980, p. 268].) This observation is valid, but the correct way to
account for it is to respecify the equation so that the effect of tax structure
on public sector growth may fall as public sector size increases. In any
case, like the Oates and DiLorenzo analyses, these studies also use fairly
crude measures of income elasticity of the tax structure, and do not follow
their cross sections over time.
III. Models
A. The Basic Set-Up
Assume we have data for each of I states over a period of T consecutive
5years. Let be real per capita expenditure for state i in year t.5 What
are the determinants of E.t? Previous theoretical and empirical studies have
suggested that real per capita income, Y.t, and total population, '1' are
potentially important variables.6 If public expenditures are a normal good,
E.t should vary positively with If congestion is a factor in the
consumption ofpublicgoods and services, E.t should vary with
(See Borcherding and Deacon [1972].) In addition, we consider the state
share of direct state—local expenditures, S.., and real per capita grants
received by the federal government, G.t.7 Presumably, the fewer the
responsibilities of the local sector, the larger will be state expenditure, so
E.t should vary positively with S.f. Grants should also have a positive
effect.





where v. is a random error term.8 Government. expenditure functions are
sometimes assumed to he linear in logarithms rather than levels. Our
substantive results are unchanged when a logarithmic specification is
employed.
Our basic model is equation (1) augmented with two sets of vari-
ables. First, for each year we create dichotomous variables, Dt, which take
the value 1 in year t, and zero otherwise. (The omitted year is 1983.) These
variables control fur factors in the national economic and political environ-
ment that affect states in the same way. Second, we add a variable ELt,
which is the income elasticity of state i's tax structure in year t.9 Ac—
cording tothe hypothesis that states with more elastic tax structures
experience higher growth in their public sectors, EL1 should appear with a








1. .Computationof EL. As noted earlier, Oates relied on the proportion
of all tax revenues collected by income taxes as his measure of revenue
elasticity. Implicitly, this assumes that all state income taxes have about the
same elasticity, as do other components of the state revenue systems. rn
previous work, we undertook a detailed analysis of the personal income and
sales tax systems for each of the fifty states over the period 1978—1983.
(See Feenberg and Rosen [1986].) The study was based on a stratified
random sample of 25,000 Federal Income Tax returns. The tax return data
included the state of each taxpayer. We programmed each year's major
income and sales tax rules. With this information we were able to estimate
state personal income and sales tax liabilities for each taxpaying unit. It was
then straightforward to find the elasticities of the income and sales tax
systems——increase each unit's income by one percent, and find the overall
implied percentage increase in tax liability.'0
Suppose we callthe elasticity of the combined income—sales tax system,
and p the proportion of all revenues attributable to income and sales taxes.
(For readability, we suppress state and time subscripts.) Letbe the
elasticity of the "other" components of the state tax system. Then by
definition,
ELp *(l—p).
7Now, while we know howvaries across states and over time, we did not
have the data required to compute .Neitherhave we been able to find
from other sources comprehensive and consistent estimates of this variable.
We therefore assume that is a constant .Ourguess is that this
0 0
assumptionis unlikely to do serious damage. On average, general sales and
income taxes account for more than half of state tax revenues. The fact that
the "other" component may vary across states is unlikely to be very
important for assessing the importance of the elasticity of the system as a
whole. 11




+ p5olpit +v.. (4)
Note that dividing the coefficient on by that on itit1 gives
us an estimate of .
Forthesake of comparison, we also estimated (2) using Oates's
proxy for of the elasticity of the tax system, jz,thepercentage of tax
revenues collected by the personal income tax. Here, we simply set
EL1tpit'
and substitute into (2).
2.Interaction of elasticity with size of public sector. Obviously,
the public sector cannot increase without bound. Hence, of equation
(2) cannot be positive for all sizes of the public sector.We therefore
hypothesize that the effect of the tax structure's income elasticity on
public sector growth depends negatively on the size of the public sector




8If the hypothesis is correct, we expect >Oand 51<0.
Substituting(5) into (4' we find
E.tlit + 2it
+4G.t
+T0(1_1t)] + o it
-f5+tt
+it (6)
Notethat equation (6) is nonlinear in the parameter The simplest way
to deal with this fact econometrically is to perform a grid search over 10,
andfind the value that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.
3. Correlation between right—hand side variables and the error term.
Oates pointed out that the share of state spending in state-local spending
(Sit) and federal grants (Gt) may be endogenous. In addition, the tax
structure itself may he correlated with the error term. To investigate this
endogeneity issue, we execute the specification test suggested by Wu {1973}.
The test requires a set of predetermined variables for use as instrumental
variables. Following standard practice with panel data, we employ the
current and lagged values of the predetermined variables, and the lagged
values of the endogenous variables. Of course, if the error term Vjt is
autocorrelated, use of lagged endogenous variables will lead to inconsistent
estimates. We therefore also obtained estimates with the lagged endogenous
variables omitted from the set of instrumental variables.
4. Interaction with nominal income. Oates's [1975] original specification
included the tax structure variable by itself on the right hand side.
Equations (4) and (6) are in that spirit. Perhaps, however, the income
elasticity of the tax structure should be interacted with the change in
9nominal income, After all, if nominal income does not change, then why
should the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to nominal income matter?
Indeed, if negative, then if elasticity matters, presumably real
expenditures will fall more in states with highly elastic tax systems than in
those with inelastic systems, ceteris paribusi3 These considerations suggest
that in equation (2), the elasticity term ELjt should be multiplied by the
change in nominal income. Given identity (3), this implies that instead of













i 5+t Dt v. (8)
5.Taxand expenditure limitations. During our sample period, 19 states
had either constitutional or statutory limits on the growth of expenditures or
revenues.'4(See Kenyon and Beriker [1984.) Perhaps the failure to
control for such rules might bias the coefficients on the tax structure
variables. We therefore estimated variants of the basic equation including a
dichotomous variable which controlled for the presence of fiscal limitation
rneas u r e S.
IV.Data
Preliminary analysis of the data indicated that because of extraordinarily
heavy reliance on severance fees associated with mineral and oil extraction,Alaska's system of public finance was sui generis. That state was therefore
excluded from our sample, leaving us with the remaining 49, for the period
1978—83. The data sources, and how dollar values were converted to real per
capita terms, are described in the Appendix.
The sample means and standard deviations of the key variables are
reported in Table 1. The outstanding features of the table are: (1) on
average, real magnitudes did riot change much during 1978-83; but (2) some
states experienced quite large changes, as evidenced by the relatively large
standard deviations. Thus, for example, the average change in real per
capita public sector spending is only $0.25, but its standard deviation is $39.2.
V. Results
A. Estimating the Basic Model
Although ordinary least squares estimation may be inappropriate, it
provides a good starting point, so OLS coefficients for the various models are
reported in Table 2. Column (1) shows the estimates of equation (4). Before
examining the tax structure variables, we note that the other variables have
expected signs and magnitudes. Increases in per capita income and per
capita grants have positive effects on per capita spending changes, and are
statistically significant at. conventional levels. Evaluated at the means, the
elasticity of expenditures with respect to income is 0.272; with respect to
grants it is 0.205. Increases in the state share of state—local spending
increase AEit, but the coefficient is not statistically significant; similarly,
increases in population over the range in our sample appear to exert no
important effect on changes in public sector spending. The variables
controlling for "year effects" indicate a rough downward trend in per capita
spending during our sample period.
We now turn to the coefficients of the tax structure variables. These
11results are not encouraging for the hypothesis that more elastic tax
structures are associated with larger growth in government expenditure. In
column (1), the parameter fi5, which multiplies the elasticity of the tax system
is negative, although it exceeds its standard error only by a factor
of 1.44. In addition, comparison of the coefficients on and itit
implies that the income elasticity of the "other" component of the tax system
is about —8.9. This seems absurd. However, this estimate of is quite
imprecise; we used an approximation for the standard error of the ratio of two
normal variables15 and found that its standard error is 7.67.
As suggested earlier, however, perhaps states withhighly income elastic
taxstructures have experienced large expenditure growth in the past, and
nowhave large public sectors, which are growing slowly. Column (2) of Table
2 reports the results for specification (6), which allows interaction between
theincome elasticity of the tax system and theratio of public sector
spendingto income. The coefficient multiplying ô, isstill
negative, but now it exceeds its standard error by a factor of 3. The value
of,foundby a one—dimensional grid search, is 0.72. The ordinary least
squares results in columns (1) and (2 are simply not supportive of the notion
that more elastic revenue structures are associated with higher public sector
growth.
Perhaps that these results arean artifact of our particular method of
characterizing the tax structure elasticity. To examine this possibility, we
show in column (3) the results when equation (2) is estimated with the income
elasticity proxied by Ppit the percentage of revenues raised by the personal
income tax. Recall that this is one of the variables used by Ontes in his
analysis of changes between 1960 and 1970.16 Column (4) contains a term
12interacting Ppit with Ejt/Yt. Strikingly, even with Oates's measure there is
no support for a positive relationship between income elasticity and public
sector growth. The coefficients on Ppit are negative both in the presence of
the interaction term and in its absence.
The estimates in Table 2 may be inconsistent due to correlation between
some of the right hand side variables and the error term. In light of this
possibility, we applied the specification test suggested by Wu [1973J. The
outcome of the test was as follows: Gt and Sit do not appear to be correlated
with the error term, but the tax structure variables do appear to be
correlated, at least in some variants of the basic model.17 It is therefore
more appropriate to employ two stage least squares, treating the tax
structure variables as endogenous.18
The results are reported in Table 3. Consider first the regressions
using our estimates of income elasticity of the tax structure, which are in
columns (1) and (2). With respect to the view that more elastic tax systems
lead to large growth in public expenditure, the outcome in column (1) is
still "wrong'the coefficient multiplying is negative.
Thingsin colunm (2) are somewhat more promising for the hypothesis ——
whenthe interaction term is included, the coefficient multiplying the elas-
ticity of the tax structure, ,ispositive, and the coefficient multiply-
ing the interaction term, ö, is negative. But both and 61 are estimated
very imprecisely.'9 A test of the joint significance of the tax structure
variables yields a test statistic F(2, 234)0.229, which is significant
only at the 0.80 level.
When we earninetheresults using Oates's proxy in columns (3)and(4),
the main result that emerges is that if the interaction term is included and
two stage least squares is applied, then the higher the proportion of
13revenues raised by the personal income tax, the greater the growth in
government expenditure, ceteris Without the interaction term, the
coefficient on the tax structure variable is negative. With the interaction
term, the parameters have the "right" sign. Individually, they are
insignificant; jointly, they are barely significant at conventional levels.
(F(2,234)3.23.)
So far our discussion of the parameter estimates has been mostly in
qualitative terms. Are the numbers quantitatively important? Consider the
point estimates in column (2) of Table 3, ignoring for the moment that they
are statistically insignificant. Suppose that state spending growth is
governedby those coefficients. Consider state i for which 0.50,
it =1.0,and E.t/Y.t0.10. Now consider state j which is identical except
that its tax structure has a much higher income elasticity, = 1.25.By
how much will their growths in public expenditure differ?20 According to
the coefficients in column (2), the answer is 8.686 x 0.5 x 0.25 —
58.53x 0.10 x 0.5 x 0.25, or $0.35. Thus, the coefficients of the tax structure
variablesare not only statistically insignificant; they are inconsequential in
magnitude as well.
B. Further Results
We next consider the outcomes when several changes are made in the
basic model's specification or its method of estimation. The various
experiments produced only minor changes in the estimated coefficients on the
income, population, revenue sharing, and state share of state and local
expenditure variables. To conserve space, we report only the results for the
tax structure variables and any other variables that may be of particular
interest for a given specification.
1.Interact ions with the changein nominal income. As the discussion
14surrounding equations (7) and (8) indicated, a proper test of the hypothesis
that tax structure elasticity matters may require multiplying EL by the
change in nominal income, In Table 4, row (1) reports the OLS estimate
of from equation (7); row (2) has OLS estimates of and from equation
(8). The corresponding 2SLS estimates are in rows (3) and (4). Apparently,
incorporating nominal income changes into the analysis does not save the
hypothesis. In rows (1) and (3) (which exclude E/Y) is positive, but very
small in magnitude and estimated imprecisely. Turning now to the specifica—
tions that include E/Y, the OLS estimates of and 'l in row (2) have
the "wrong" signs, and the 2SLS estimates in row (4) are small in absolute
value and statistically insignificant. The tax structure variables in row
(4) are also jointly insignificant; the test statistic for their exclusion,
F(2, 234), is 0.095, which is significant only at the 0.91 level.
2.Tax and expenditure limitations. Several states introduced tax or
expenditure limitation (TEL) rules during our sample period. Using
information in Kenyon and Benker [1984, p. 437], we created the variable Lit,
which takes the value of 1 if there was no tax or expenditure limitation in
state i during year t, and zero otherwise. The results when the basic models
(equations (4) and (6)) are augmented with Lt and estimated with two stage
least squares are presented in rows (5) and (6) of Table 4. Two main results
emerge:
a. Comparing rows (5) and (6) to columns (1) and (2) in Table 3, we find
that controlling for TEL rules does not alter the basic result of a weak or
nonexistent impact of tax structure on the growth of state expenditures. The
coefficients barely change. (When equations using Oates's proxy are
augmented with Lit, the results are similarly unchanged; these are not
reported here.)
15b. TEL rules exert virtually no impact on the growth in real
expenditure, ceteris paribus. The coefficients on Lit are small both in
absolute value and relative to their standard errors. Keriyon and Benker
[19841 arrived at the same conclusion on the basis of a somewhat more
informal analysis of the data. They provide an interesting discussion about
the apparent inefficacy of these measures. One possible explanation is that
on average, TEL's cover only 60 percent of state revenues or expenditures.
Another is that sluggish growth in revenues during our sample period kept
some states below their statutory limits. In any case, we do not regard
these results as "proof" of the irrelevance of TEL's. The important point is
that the apparent unimportance of tax structures is not a consequence of
ignoring them.
3. Alternative instrumental variables. To the extent that the error term
in our equation is autocorrelated, the use of lagged endogenous variables as
instruments will lead to inconsistent estimates. We therefore repeated our
two stage least squares procedure using only the current and lagged values
of the predetermined variables as instruments. The results are presented in
rows (7) and (8), which correspond to columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. These
estimates suggest that if there was a bias operating in Table 3, it was in the
direction of favoring the hypothesis that tax structure matters.
V. Summary
Does the revenue elasticity of tax structure with respect to income exert
an independent effect on the growth of public spending? To answer this
question, we examined the annual growth of real state per capita expenditure
during the period 1978—83. Our main finding is that there is no evidence
that more income elastic tax structures are associated with higher rates of
public sector growth, ceteris paribus. This result is robust with respect to
16changes in how tax structures are characterized, changes in the choice of
right hand side variables, and changes in estimation technique. If
governments really are out to expand the public sector beyond the size
desired by their citizens, they must be using some other mechanism.
17APPENDIX
This Appendix documents the sources of data employed in the statistical
analysis.
All figures on state expenditures and revenues (including grants) are
from various editions of U.S.Departmentof Commerce, State Government
Finances. Data for 1977 are found in the 1978 edition, 1978 data in the 1979
edition, etc. Population data for 1977 through 1979 are in the 1979 through
1981 editions of U.S. Department of Commerce, State Government Tax
Collections. The 1980 through 1983 population figures are from Current
Population Report, Series P—25, #944, "Estimates of the Population of States
1980—1983," January, 1984.
Total personal income by states for 1977—83 is from Department of
Commerce, Survey of Current Business, August, 1984.
The elasticities of the state tax structures are from Feenberg and
Rosen [1986]. Nominal dollar values for income were converted into 1977
terms by use of regional price defiators found in U.S. Department of
Commerce [19821. The price deflator for state and local public goods is from
various editions of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current
Business. (September 1981, July 1983 and July 1984.)
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20Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of the Variables
real state government expenditure per capita (Et) 804
(161)
change in Eit (Eit) $0.253
(39.2)
real grants from federal government per capita (Gt) $226
(59.1)
change in GIt (Gt) $—7.09
(19.2)
state share in state—local spending (SIt) 44.6
(9.40)
change in Sj (St) 0.140
(4.416)




population* (t) 4540 thousand
(4640)
change in Pj* (Pt) 59.8 thousand
(129)
elasticityof combined personal
income—sales tax system (sit) 0.753
times income—sales tax share (Pit) (0.915)
percentage of all taxes due to 23.9
personal income tax (Ppit) (14.6)
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-0. 2948
(0. 1501)







(2) [(eq. (8), OLS] —34.75 200.8
(14.78) (80.96)
(3) [eq. (7), 2SLS] 9.128
(5.795)
(4) [eq. (8), 2SLS] 22.49 -122.4
(34.77) (200.4)
TEL
(5)[eq. (4) +Lit, —12.61 2.686
2SLS] (8.278) (5.612)
(6) [eq. (6) +LIt, 9.674 —67.11 3.150






(8) [eq. (6), 2SLS] --31.11 88.73
(49.05)(313.7)
*Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
**In rows (1) through (4), each figure is multiplied by iü to enhance
readibility.
24Footnotes
'For a discussion of other types of fiscal illusion see Oates [1985].One
possibility is that the more complex the tax structure, the more difficult
it is for taxpayers to figure out the tax burden of public programs. As Oates
observes, however, it is far from obvious how to measure tax system complexi-
ty. The Herfindahi index of tax instrument concentration is often used, but
it does not correspond to intuitive notions of what "complexity" is.rn any
case, we believe that inability to control for complexity will not seriously
bias our estimates of the impact of elasticity on tax structure.
2Apparently Wagner believes that if citizens understood the fiscalsystem,
they could control it. Hence, his view is less extreme than Brennan and
Buchanan's [1980, p. 35]: "The citizenry has no effective control over
government, once established, beyond the constraints that are imposed
constitutionally."
3We are grateful to a referee for pointing out this possibility tous.
4Moreover, the elasticity of the income tax is quite different from that of
the general sales tax. Of the states with income taxes, the minimum elasti-
city in 1983 was 1.0. On the other hand, the maximum sales tax elasticity was
0.73.
51t could be argued that our focus should be state and localexpenditure corn—
bined. There are two reasons for concentrating on state expenditure: (1)
the state is a single budgetary unit; and (2) we do not have good information
on stat.e by stat:e variation in the income e1asticity of the local property
tax.
6flecause voter participation rates vary positively with income, and the income
distribution is positively skewed, majority voting may be indicative of the
preferences of the voter with mean rather than median income. (See Atkinson
and Stiglitz E1980, p. 217].)
7tnman [1979] and others have noted that matching grants haveprice effects,
so that strictly speaking, they should not be combined with lump sum grants
to form a single "grants variable." In light of this problem, the coefficient
)ngrantsmust be interpreted with caution.
8Fquation (1) can be viewed as a relation in the levels which has been
differenced in order to remove a fixed effect. The possibility of sluggish:
ness in changing fiscal behavior could be incorporated by using a stock
adjustment model, which amounts to including the lagged dependent variable
on the right—hand side. When we tested such a model, wediscovered that the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variables was insignificant, and that
its inc1usjon had little effect on the other coefficients. While we do not
regard this as "proof" that. intertemporal considerations are unimportant, it
does suggest that allowing for dynamics, at least in a simple way, does not
affect our substantive conclusions.
9We also experimented with specifications in which the lagged value of
EL was employed, and the outcome did not change appreciably.
25'°Note that the relevant elasticity is that of nominal tax revenue with respect
to nominal income. Hence, for a completely indexed system, if all prices and
nominal incomes increased by the same percentage, the elasticity would be one.
"In one set of experiments we divided the portion .of revenues due neither to
personal income nor general sales taxes into corporate income tax and non—
corporate income tax components. Hence, instead of (3) we have
EL = +Pcc + (lLijJC)flC, wherethe c subscript denotes corporate, the
nc subscript denotes noncorporate, andtheother variables are defined
analogously to those in c3).Thischange in specification had no effect
on our substantive conclusions.
'21n a somewhat different context, Courant et al. [1979] present a formal
model of the forces that would tend to put limits on the process of govern-
ment growth.
1-3The change in nominal per capita income was negative in only 4percentof
ourobservations. We experimented with a specification which allowed an
asymmetric response in those cases, but found that it did not add to the
explanatory power of the equation. Perhaps that is because there were so
few of these cases.
1-4However, Nevada and Rhode Island had nonbinding limits, and Utah's limit
was never implemented. For our purposes, these states are classified as not
having limitations.
1-55et ry/x. Then var(r)(l/x2) [var(y) + r2var(x) —2rcov(y,x)].
See Kish [1967, p. 207].
'6We also employed another of Oates's proxies, the proportion of total
revenue comprised of corporate and personal income taxes. The results are
substantially unchanged.
-7The instruments used in the test were the contemporaneous values of the
predetermined variables, and the lagged values of all the variables. These
are the same instruments used in the two stage least squares regressions
reported later. For the specification (6), the joint test of whether the tax
structure variables are uncorrelated with Vjt yields F(2,232) z3.54,which is
significant at the 0.031 level. In the model without interactions, the F
statistic is only 0.956, which is not significant at conventional levels.
However, for the sake of completeness, we estimated both specifications by
two stage least squares.
18In comparing the results to those in Table 2, note that in Table 3 one
observation is "lost" due to the fact that lagged values are used as
instruments. However, when OLS is applied to the shortened sample, the
results are very similar to those in Table 2.
190ne wonders whether the negative sign on the interaction term has nothing
to do with tax structure issues, and merely reflects the fact that already
large public sectors tend to grow slowly. To investigate this possibility, we
augmented equation (4) with the variable Et/Yt. Under both OLS and 2SLS,
26the coefficient on was statistically insignificant, and the coefficients
on the tax structure variables differed little from their counterparts in
Tables 3 and 4.
20Notethat in this particular conceptual experiment, the value of
is irrelevant.
27